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Abstract
In the 1980's and 1990's HIV/AIDS was the emerging infectious disease. In 2003–2004 we saw the
emergence of SARS, Avian influenza and Anthrax in a man made form used for bioterrorism.
Emergency powers legislation in Australia is a patchwork of Commonwealth quarantine laws and
State and Territory based emergency powers in public health legislation. It is time for a review of
such legislation and time for consideration of the efficacy of such legislation from a country wide
perspective in an age when we have to consider the possibility of mass outbreaks of communicable
diseases which ignore jurisdictional boundaries.
The management of infectious diseases in an increasingly
complex world of mass international travel, globalization
and terrorism heightens challenges for Federal, State and
Territory Governments in ensuring that Australia's laws
are sufficiently flexible to address the types of problems
that may emerge.
In the 1980's and 1990's HIV/AIDS was the latest "emerg-
ing infectious disease". Considerable thought was put
into the legislative response by a number of Australian
jurisdictions. Particular attention had to be given to the
unique features of the disease such as the method of trans-
mission, the kinds of people who were at risk, and the
protections needed by the community and the infected
population to best manage the care of those infected and
to minimize new infections. Health workers and research-
ers began to find that "the most effective strategies that we
have so far found to help promote reduction of the spread
of HIV involve the adoption of laws and policies which
protect the rights of people most at risk of infection" [1].
A good example of a legislative response which adopts
this approach is found in section 119 and 120 of the Vic-
torian Health Act 1958. These sections emphasize the need
to protect the privacy of the infected individual and to
undertake a staged response which is proportional to the
risk presented by the infected individual. The legislation
has been very effective with HIV and has been praised for
its progressive approach [2].
In 2003 the community has been faced with the emer-
gence of two new infectious diseases, SARS and Anthrax.
Whilst there were no cases of either disease in Australia,
the threat of a possible outbreak had to be acknowledged
and a response planned. Anthrax is not a new infectious
disease. Humans can become infected with anthrax by
handling products from infected animals or by breathing
in anthrax spores from infected animal products (like
wool, for example). People also can become infected with
gastrointestinal anthrax by eating undercooked meat from
infected animals. However, its manufacture and use as a
weapon for bioterrorism forces us to rethink its manage-
ment in a new context.
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These two infectious diseases have very different features
from HIV which spreads only via transmission of infected
bodily fluids such as blood or semen. SARS, by contrast is
transmitted via droplets from infected cases which, as a
result of coughing, carry the virus to close contacts [3]
Thus, the infection profile of SARS requires planning for
the possible overrun of Intensive Care Units and the likely
infection of a number of ICU staff affecting both morale
and capacity to cope. Anthrax raised different problems.
These include the possible investigation of terrorist sus-
pects alongside investigation of the outbreak of the infec-
tious disease. Difficulties are also raised by likelihood of
public panic, and the flooding of public health officials
with reports of suspicious white powder.
In early 2004 the media reported the spread of avian influ-
enza across South East Asia. This disease has different fea-
tures from HIV/AIDS and SARS and an approach to an
Australian outbreak would also be different. The main dif-
ference is in the source of transmission of the virus, that is,
from infected birds to humans. There is very little differ-
ence [from ordinary influenza] in the symptoms (though
these may vary in severity) or treatment of the virus [4] It
is too early to predict whether this may be the next
"emerging infectious disease", but its current spread has
given rise to concern about such a possibility [5]
Australia is a federal system. There are two parallel sets of
laws in operation. The Commonwealth Constitution sets
out the legislative powers of the Commonwealth. Specific
powers are listed in the Commonwealth constitution but
State constitutions have broad powers covering matters
such as peace, order and good governance. As the Com-
monwealth has no specific power to legislate with respect
to health, other than the quarantine power, national leg-
islative schemes in public health which rely upon a coop-
erative approach from all States and Territories are
cumbersome and difficult.
Without a specific head of power, the Commonwealth has
limited ability to legislate with respect to health. "That is,
the legislative powers of the Commonwealth are specified
in the Constitution and do not include expressly most of
the activities that together comprise the field of public
health"[6] For this reason, there are no Commonwealth
emergency health powers except quarantine powers.
Quarantine powers are currently restricted to isolation at
the border of the country of people, plants, and animals
to prevent the spread of disease. There is a real possibility
that quarantine laws could have a broader scope. It
depends on how widely the High Court would interpret
section 51(x) of the Commonwealth Constitution. A
quarantine law could override state laws as long as it
remained a law "with respect to quarantine". However,
"the power is potentially a colossus so far as the expansion
of legislative authority in the fields of public health is con-
cerned". [6]
The quarantine power would be the most likely candidate
for a head of power on which to base development of
commonwealth laws for the management of public health
emergencies. Another possibility may be the external
affairs power, if there was a relevant treaty or international
agreement which could be given effect to in domestic law.
However the legislation would have to be limited to laws
giving effect to the treaty.
States and territories have a range of emergency powers
available to them in their existing public health legisla-
tion. Some are relatively old. For example, the Health Act
1911 (WA), Public Health Act 1952 (NT) based on an 1898
Ordinance (Both these Acts are currently under review).
Health emergency powers vary from one jurisdiction to
another, but include powers to support disease surveil-
lance, contact tracing and orders to restrict behavior or
movement of individuals with an infectious disease in cer-
tain circumstances. There are also powers to recall food,
search premises and seize property, close buildings and a
range of other substantial and intrusive powers.
It is suggested that it is time to consider whether state and
territory public health legislation contains sufficient
measures to manage the outbreak of an infectious disease
in a modern environment which includes mass travel,
swift spread of infection and additional complexity raised
by fears of bioterrorism.
Currently, in a public health emergency caused by the
spread of an emerging infectious disease, Australia could
need to rely on a patchwork of legislative measures to
assist it to cope. Commonwealth quarantine laws and
State and Territory powers in public health legislation
may all be needed to address the problem. If an outbreak
occurred on a border, or in some area where jurisdiction
may be in doubt such as airspace or offshore and a state or
territory response was required in addition to any quaran-
tine measures, there could be confusion over jurisdiction
for the application of State and Territory powers. State and
Territory public health acts do not adequately provide for
interjurisdictional communication and cooperation.
There could also be difficulties if an infectious disease
caused overseas deaths of people from more than one
State or Territory in circumstances where an Australian
coronial investigation was considered desirable. In such a
situation, the jurisdiction of more than one Australian
coroner would be triggered. Several State and Territory
coronial laws could apply and there could be different
inquests under different laws undertaken by different cor-
oners into the same incident.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2004, 1:7 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/1/1/7
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It is suggested that it is time to look at the efficiency of the
emergency powers laws of Australia as a whole: to map the
laws in each jurisdiction and the Commonwealth quaran-
tine laws and to consider their effectiveness in the face of
the outbreak of a fast moving, easily spread infectious dis-
ease. The efficacy of Australia's laws should also be con-
sidered in relation to bioterrorism. While there were no
infections from anthrax in 2003 despite a great deal of
media coverage and infections and deaths in the US, a
responsible legislature ought to acknowledge the possibil-
ity and ensure that the law is ready to support a swift and
effective response.
It is not enough to consider whether the individual pieces
of legislation are up to the task of managing outbreaks of
newly emerging infectious diseases. Indeed many of the
jurisdictions are currently reviewing their public health
legislation and will no doubt give proper consideration to
this issue as part of the review. But who is thinking about
how the legislation of all jurisdictions and the Common-
wealth quarantine fits together? What powers enable com-
munication and cooperation between jurisdictions about
the outbreak of infectious disease? What kind of opportu-
nity is there for a coordinated response? Can public health
orders made in one jurisdiction travel to another jurisdic-
tion when the infected individual travels? What arrange-
ments can be made if an outbreak occurs on or close to a
interstate border? What if there is an outbreak on a bus
carrying passengers from Victoria, through South Aus-
tralia to the Northern Territory?
It is encouraging to note that, even without specific legis-
lation, there has been a mechanism to achieve communi-
cation and cooperation between jurisdictions through the
Communicable Disease Network of Australia (CDNA).
This Network has in fact been quite successful in fostering
regular communication between the Communicable Dis-
ease Units across the country and has been involved in
coordinated actions during a number of multistate out-
breaks.
Despite the existence of this network and other good
working relationships between government officials and
various agencies in different jurisdictions, a serious out-
break of communicable disease would require the exist-
ence of legislative powers. Public health emergencies
generate confusion, even panic. Clarity of powers and the
way those powers interact with each other would be cru-
cial in an emergency. It became apparent after the Bali
tragedy in 2002 that coroner's jurisdiction was triggered
differently in different jurisdictions and some acts did not
support communication and cooperation when inquests
might be needed for deaths of people ordinarily resident
in several jurisdictions. The time to find the shortcomings
in the legislation is well before the crisis.
A review of the efficacy of how these laws work together to
protect the public health of all Australians should be
undertaken. It has been possible to overcome the hango-
vers of federation for the betterment of all Australians in
relation to corporations law. When doubts were recently
raised about the constitutional basis of the corporations
law scheme, the States and Territories were able to coop-
erate and refer the necessary powers to the Common-
wealth to provide certainty about the laws which govern
our corporations. Is our public health any less important
than governance of our corporations? Could we cooperate
to give ourselves certainty, flexibility and a consistent
approach which protects the rights of those subject to
some very broad powers?
The States and Territories are generally reluctant to refer
powers to the Commonwealth. It may be time to seriously
discuss referral of powers in the context of health emer-
gency powers. At the very least, it is time that the Com-
monwealth, States and Territories recognised the need for
the laws to work as a set of laws to protect the whole coun-
try, not simply individual laws to protect individual juris-
dictions.
There has been work done internationally in this area. A
model State Emergency Health Powers Act has been devel-
oped in the US in 2001 [7] In the preamble to this Act a
rationale for its development is set out: "In the wake of the
tragic events of September 11, 2001, our nation realizes
that the Government's foremost responsibility is to pro-
tect the health, safety and wellbeing of its citizens. New
and emerging dangers including emergent and resurgent
infectious diseases and incidents of civilian mass casual-
ties – pose serious and immediate threats to the popula-
tion. A renewed focus on the prevention, detection,
management and containment of public health emergen-
cies is thus called for." The US, like Australia, is a Federal
system. The model was intended to be taken up by those
US states which wished to do so. To date, it has been
passed in over half the US states. This bill would be an
excellent starting point for development of an Australian
model. There are a number of legislative mechanisms
which could be used to support a nationally uniform
approach to health emergency powers legislation in Aus-
tralia.
The development and adoption of the model food legisla-
tion provides a useful model of a cooperative uniform
approach. A model act was developed in consultation
with all jurisdictions. It covered areas agreed to be core
areas of the Act which ought to be the subject of a national
approach and other provisions which were considered to
be administrative and were to be adopted at the discretion
of each jurisdiction. An intergovernmental agreement was
signed as a mechanism to protect the uniformity of thePublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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legislation. The agreement sets up a Ministerial Council,
supported by a Food Regulation Standing Committee.
The Council has responsibility for deciding on proposals
to amend the model [8] If a decision is made in favor of
amendment, States and Territories will use their best
endeavors to submit to their respective Parliaments, legis-
lation which gives effect to the amendment.
The law is an important tool in supporting the manage-
ment of the outbreak of infectious diseases. The existence
of our Federal system has meant that we have a different
approach in each State and Territory together with Com-
monwealth control of quarantine. Newly emerging infec-
tious diseases creating real threats to public health in an
era of easy mass travel, and the present threat of bioterror-
ism mean that it is time Australia examined all laws to
contain and manage infectious disease outbreak. The laws
should be examined both for their effectiveness in the
areas they cover, and as part of a whole which ought ena-
ble a response which protects the health of all Australians,
and crosses borders as easily as SARS or avian influenza.
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